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Abstract 
 
Classic studies in developmental psychology demonstrate a relatively late 
development of equity, with children as old as 6 or even 8 to 10 years failing to follow the 
logic of merit—that is, giving more to those who contributed more. Following Piaget, these 
studies have been taken to indicate that judgements of justice develop slowly and follow a 
stage-like progression starting off with simple rules (e.g., equality: everyone receives the 
same) and only later on in development evolving into more complex ones (e.g., equity: 
distributions match contributions). Here, we report two experiments with 3- and 4-year-old 
children (N = 195) that contradict this constructivist account. Our results demonstrate that 
children as young as three years old are able to take merit into account by distributing tokens 
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according to individual contributions but that this ability may be hidden by a preference for 
equality. 
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Preschoolers are able to take merit into account when distributing goods 
 
Justice can be at the same time very simple and very complicated (Sandel, 2010). It is 
simple because it amounts to distributing resources in a fair way, not giving advantage to 
anyone (Rawls, 1971). It is complicated because being fair often involves taking into account 
a vast array of parameters (efforts, needs, investments, etc.) that are difficult to evaluate and 
quantify. Moreover, the very same logic of fairness can lead to different distributions. When 
individuals are in the same position, for instance because they have equally contributed to the 
production a common good, equality may be the fairest way to distribute resources. By 
contrast, when individuals are in different positions, for instance because one of them has 
contributed more, being egalitarian may amount to favoring the one who contributed less (by 
offering them a better ―rate of return‖ from their work). Thus, if people want to be fair, they 
sometimes ought to give more to the ones who contributed more. 
The difficulty of implementing fairness in the real world is probably the reason why, 
following Piaget (1932), judgements of justice have long been thought to emerge very 
gradually and to follow a stage-like progression from irrelevant rules (such as giving 
according to one‘s own preferences) to simple rules (such as equality: everyone gets the 
same) to more complex ones later on in development (such as equity: distributions match 
contributions). In line with this approach, classic studies demonstrate a relatively late 
development of equity, with children as old as 6 or even 8 to 10 failing to follow the logic of 
merit, i.e., failing to give more to those who contribute more (e.g., in tasks involving the 
distribution of money after a common phase of artwork production) (Damon, 1975, 1980; R. 
D. Enright & Sutterfield, 1980; R. D. Enright et al., 1984; Kohlberg, 1969; McGillicuddy-de 
Lisi, Watkins, & Vinchur, 1994; Nelson & Dweck, 1977; C. Peterson, Peterson, & 
McDonald, 1975; Sigelman & Waitzman, 1991). 
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In the last decades, an alternative to this constructivist position has emerged. This 
approach draws from general accounts of fairness coming from evolutionary biology (Trivers, 
1971), behavioural economics (Binmore, 2005) and moral philosophy (Rawls, 1971). In this 
framework, it is posited that humans are endowed with a a universal ‗sense of fairness‘, an 
adaptation designed to regulate cooperative interactions (fro empirical evidence, see for 
instance Robinson, Kurzban, & Jones, 2006). Humans are indeed uniquely cooperative and, 
contrary to to great apes, obtain most of their ressources through collaborative interactions 
such as hunting, gathering, or exchanging goods and services (Kaplan, Hill, Lancaster, & 
Hurtado, 2000; Tomasello, 2009). In this highly cooperative context, recent evolutionary 
models have shown that fairness is the optimal strategy (André & Baumard, 2011, 2012; 
Chiang, 2010). Individuals are indeed in competition to be recruited in cooperative 
interactions and those who take a bigger share of common benefits are left out for more 
advantageous partners. This perspective allows for a better understanding of why merit is 
strongly valued by humans. If A invested three units of resources in the interaction while B 
invested only one, she then ought to receive a payoff exactly three times greater than B 
(otherwise B would benefit more from the interaction than A and A would be better off 
leaving for another partner). Distributing resources according to merit is thus the best way to 
share the benefits of cooperation in a mutually advantageous way. 
Although evolutionary theories do not contradict the idea of a progressive 
development of justice judgments, they render the idea of an early development of complex 
judgments of justice more plausible (the same argument hold for a variety of domains, see for 
instance the case of numbers, Dehaene, 1997; for a general discussion, see Barkow, 
Cosmides, & Tooby, 1992; Bloom, 2004;  Pinker, 1997). Indeed, the idea that humans are 
predisposed to develop a sense of fairness is at the heart of this approach. Such a 
predisposition might help children to overcome the complexity of judgments of justice from 
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an early age. In line with this idea, recent experiments using looking time measures have 
shown that 12 to 18 months old infants are sensitive to inequity (Geraci & Surian, 2011; 
Schmidt & Sommerville, 2011; see also LoBue, Nishida, Chiong, DeLoache, & Haidt, 2011). 
When actively involving involved in the task, children as young as 3 years old share mostly 
equally after having worked together to obtain rewards in a collaborative task, even when 
those rewards could easily be monopolized (Warneken, Lohse, Melis, & Tomasello, 2011; see 
also Blake & Rand, 2010). Moreover, as a follow-up study demonstrated, sharing is clearly 
related to the collaborative nature of the task: 3-year-olds share with others much more 
equitably in these contexts than they do in either windfall or parallel-work situations 
(Hamann, Warneken, Greenberg, & Tomasello, 2011). 
 Taken together, these studies suggest that fairness, i.e., the ability to share the benefits 
of social interactions in a mutually advantageous way, may be present very early in ontogeny. 
A finer test would be to study whether children are able to match contribution and distribution 
in order to maintain fair interactions with their partners. So far, however, evidence for such an 
ability have been lacking. What may have prevented previous research from identifying such 
complex judgments of justice, we argue, is that experiments were often overly demanding for 
young children. To single out a representative example, consider the following scenario: 
children are told a story about a group of three characters making clay pots together. Each 
character is associated with identifying characteristics: one is the oldest, one is poor, and one 
is the most productive. Ultimately, the clay pots are sold for $9 and the child is asked to state 
the number of dollars each character should get (taken from Sigelman & Waitzman, 1991). 
Here, young children are likely to have struggled with the fact that numerous tokens need to 
be manipulated and that the whole situation is not very familiar to them.  
In more recent studies reporting a late development of equity children were directly 
affected by the distribution, which may have biased them to serve their own interests. In Fehr 
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et al. (2008) for instance, children as old as 7 were reluctant to distribute tokens equally when 
they had the option to get more for themselves (see Rochat & Dias, 2009 for a similar 
problem). Young children may find it difficult to be moral when there is a cost for themselves 
(Moore, 2009; Thompson, Barresi, & Moore, 1997).  
In the two experiments presented here, children were told a story about two characters 
who decide to bake cookies together. One gets tired, stops working and starts to play. The 
other character agrees to continue cooking whilst declaring that it is hard work. Eventually, 
the cookies are done and children are asked to distribute them. This task addresses the 
concerns discussed above. First, there are only two or three tokens to distribute and the 
scenario is extremely simple. Moreover, the answer is behavioural rather than verbal, which is 
less challenging for young children. The experimenter gives some fake cookies and children 
manipulate them themselves. Second, the child has no personal interest in the outcome of the 
distribution. Finally, adult interference is reduced to a minimum and the child is encouraged 
to rely on her own interpretation of the situation.  
In Experiment 1, we examine whether children are able to take merit into account. 
Children have to distribute a small cookie and a big cookie. Two options are thus available to 
them: giving a big cookie to the greater contributor (and a small cookie to the lesser 
contributor) or giving a big cookie to the lesser contributor (and a small cookie to the greater 
contributor). Although none of these choices is ideal (since the big cookie is much bigger than 
the small cookie), we reasoned that if children understand merit, they will consider that 
favouring the big contributor is the ‗least bad‘ solution. This forced choice scenario, however, 
gave us no access to children‘s ideal choice. It may be the case that children are able to take 
merit into account but prefer egalitarian distributions in particular situations (in our scenario, 
for instance, they might think that although the character who worked more has slightly more 
rights over the cookies, this does not warrant an unequal distribution). In Experiment 2, we 
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relaxed the constraints placed on the distribution by allowing children to distribute three 
cookies of equal size as they wished. If children prefer equality in our scenario, they should 
give each character one cookie and not distribute the third cookie. In a second phase of the 
experiment, we asked children to distribute the remaining cookie(s) thereby allowing them to 
make use of their capacity to take merit into account in spite of their potential preference for 
equality. 
 
 
Experiment 1 
Preschoolers are presented with a typical situation of distributive justice involving 
varying levels of contribution. We predict that children will favour the big contributor over 
the small contributor and distribute the tokens accordingly.  
 
Experiment 1 
Method 
 Participants. 121 preschoolers were tested: 35 took part in pretest 1 (Mean age = 
48.1 months; range 36 – 58, 13 girls), 35 took part in pretest 2 (Mean age = 48.1 months; 
range 38 – 60, 14 girls) and 51 took part in the test (M = 50.3 months; range 36 – 58). 
Children in the test phase were divided in two age groups: 3- to 4-year-olds (n = 20; M = 44.1 
months; SD = 3.5; range 38–48; 11 girls) and 4- to 5-year-olds (n = 31; M = 54.3 months; SD 
= 3.1; range 48–60; 12 girls). Data regarding ethnicity were not collected. To keep the sample 
homogeneous in term of socioeconomic background, recruitment was restricted to middle 
class school catchment areas in Paris and Lyon (France), and excluded private schools (which 
typically enrol families with higher SES) or ZEP schools (which enrol students living in the 
10% poorest catchment areas). Head teachers were contacted over the phone by one of the 
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experimenters and sent general information about the study and procedures if they were 
interested in taking part. The school administration then sent an information sheet and consent 
form to every parent of a child in the targeted age group. Data for each experimental phase 
(pretest 1, pretest 2, test) were collected sequentially and a given test phase only started when 
data collection for the previous phase had been completed (note also that children in a given 
school were allocated to the same experiment or pretest, hence the slight variation in sample 
size across experiments and pretests).  
Material and procedure. Participants were tested individually in a quiet room they 
were familiar to and close to their own classroom. In the test phase, the experimenter 
introduced the characters of the story, saying: See, this is Amélie, and this is Hélène. Amélie 
and Hélène are very good friends. Can you show me Hélène? Can you show me Amélie? 
Good! Bravo! The experimenter then ensured that the child had memorized their names by 
asking her to point to Amélie (right) and to Hélène (left) (see Figure 1, picture 1). The 
experimenter then showed picture 2 and said: Today, Amélie and Hélène have decided to bake 
cookies. See, they’re in the kitchen, they’re making cookies! After a little while, Hélène is 
bored of making the cookies. Amélie says: “Yes, it’s tiring to bake cookies but I’m OK to 
finish on my own.” The experimenter then showed the third picture and said: Hélène goes to 
play with her doll. Yeepee! It’s fun to play dolls! At this point, the first control question was 
asked: Does Hélène find it fun to play dolls? If the child provided the correct answer, the 
experimenter then proceeded to the fourth picture, saying: In the meantime, Amélie is 
finishing the cookies. She says: “Phew!! This is such hard work! It’s so tiring to make these 
cookies!” Amélie is working really hard, and the second control question was asked1: Does 
Amélie find that it’s a lot of work to bake the cookies? If the correct answer was provided, the 
experimenter showed the final picture and said: That’s it! Amélie is done! The cookies are 
                                                 
1
 If the child did not provide the correct answer, she was prompted again. 
Justice Children 9 
ready! Mum says: “You can each have a cookie”. She puts two cookies on a plate. There is 
one small cookie and one big cookie. Hélène and Amélie both want the big cookie. Is it better 
to give the big cookie to Amélie or to Hélène? Picture 1 was presented again and the child 
answered the test question either by naming the character or by pointing to her picture. After 
the child had made her choice, she was explicitly asked to justify her answer. To do so, the 
experimenter asked ―Why?” after the child indicated whether it was better to give the big 
cookie to Amélie or to Helène. Justifications mentioning the characters‘ respective levels of 
contribution were considered correct (e.g., ―because Amélie prepared more of the cake‖). 
Other justifications (e.g., ―because she has a big mouth‖) or absence of justification (―don‘t 
know‖ or silence) were coded as incorrect. A second coder classified the children‘s 
justifications. Agreement between coders was 100% in Experiment 1 and 2. 
Pretest 1. In order to ensure that children had no a priori preference for Amélie or 
Hélène, the experimenter asked the children to distribute the cookies after having seen the 
first picture only. The experimenter followed the same procedure for picture 1 and then went 
straight to the distribution phase.  
Pretest 2. To check that children did not give the big cookie to Amélie for reasons 
unrelated to justice, we ran another pretest where we presented picture 1 and then explained 
that Hélène was playing dolls (picture 3) and Amélie was cooking (picture 4) but where no 
justice-related information was provided. Children were then asked to distribute items 
unrelated to both activities (i.e. a small gift-wrapping and a big gift-wrapping). This allowed 
us to make sure that children did not give the big cookie to Amélie because they favoured the 
activity she was associated with (cooking vs. playing dolls) or because she was displaying 
facial signs of effort. We used the same script as in the test except for the final picture: Mum 
brings two gifts. There is one small gift and one big gift. Hélène and Amélie both want the big 
gift. Is it better to give the big gift to Amélie or to Hélène? 
Justice Children 10 
 
Please Insert Figure 1 about here 
 
Results and discussion 
Note that all p-values assume a two-tailed test. 
Pretest 1. When presented with picture 1 on its own, children (N = 35; M = 48.1 
months; range 36 – 58) were just as likely (p = 1.00, two-choice binomial) to give the big 
cookie to Amélie (n = 18) and Hélène (n = 16). This indicates that children had no a priori 
preference for Amélie. 
Pretest 2. Fourteen children gave the big present to Amélie and 21 gave it to Hélène, 
which is not different from chance (p = 0.31, two-choice binomial). This suggests that 
children did not give the big cookie to Amélie because they favoured the activity she was 
associated with (cooking vs. playing dolls) or because she was displaying facial signs of 
effort. 
Test. Thirty-eight children out of 51 gave the big cookie to Amélie (the girl who had 
contributed more), a distribution different from chance (p = .002, two-choice binomial, OR = 
2.92) and from the one observed in both pretests (pretest 1: χ²(1) = 4.22, p < .05, OR = 2.60; 
pretest 2: χ²(1) = 10.34, p < .005, OR = 4.38). Analysis in each age group confirmed this 
result: 15 3-year olds out of 20 (p = .04, two-choice binomial, OR = 3) and 23 4-year olds out 
of 30 (p = .01, two-choice binomial, OR = 3.29) chose to give the big cookie to Amélie. A 
chi-square test revealed no difference between the age groups, χ²(1) = .004, p = .95, and also 
no significant impact of the child‘s sex or child sex on the distribution pattern, χ²(1) = 2.9, p = 
.09. Children‘s justifications were also analysed. Overall, 11 children provided correct 
justifications: 1 out of 20 in the group of 3-year olds and 11 out of 31 in the group of 4-year 
olds. Note that though there was a marked increase in children‘s capacity to justify their 
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judgments (p = .017, Fisher‘s test, OR = 10.45), most 4-year olds still struggled to provide 
accurate explanations for their choices. It is interesting to note that such a gap between 
judgments and justifications is also commonly reported in the adult literature and suggests 
that moral judgments are independent form language (Haidt, 2001; Hauser, Cushman, Young, 
& Jin, 2007).   
In sum, preschoolers appear to be able to take the characters‘ respective contributions 
into account by giving more to the one who played a bigger role in the production of a 
common benefit. This result shows that children are able to understand merit and come up 
with an equitable solution much earlier than previously thought (e.g. Damon, 1980; 
McGillicuddy-de Lisi, et al., 1994). It is important to note, however, that our forced choice 
scenario tells us nothing about children‘s ideal choice: Since the cookies had different sizes, 
children had no way of expressing a preference for an egalitarian solution. What Experiment 1 
allows us to conclude is that young children are able to take merit into account, not that this is 
their preferred option. In Experiment 2, we relaxed the constraints placed on the distribution 
to have access to young children‘s spontaneous preferred option in a similar situation.  
 
Experiment 2 
We used the same story structure as in Experiment 1, but this time three cookies of the 
same size were available for distribution. Children were offered all three cookies at once and 
had the opportunity to distribute them the way they wanted (with no further constraints 
imposed by the experimenter). Once they showed signs that they had completed the 
distribution, the experimenter recorded their initial distribution and, if relevant, prompted 
them to distribute any spare cookie. While remaining very simple, this design offers children 
a wider range of possible distributions including that of distributing the cookies equally. We 
predicted that some children would spontaneously favour equality but that beyond this 
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egalitarian response children would still think that the greater contributor has a right to 
slightly more than the smaller contributor.  
 
Method 
 Participants. Seventy-five preschoolers were tested. They belonged to two age groups: 
3- to 4-year-olds (n = 33; M = 42.7 months; SD = 3.4; range 34–48; 17 girls) and 4- to 5-year-
olds (n = 42; M = 54.2 months; SD = 2.6; range 49–58; 19 girls). An additional 7 children 
were eliminated because they did not speak French (1), they refused to complete the whole 
experiment (4), or they failed to answer prompt questions (2).  
Materials and procedure. The materials and procedure were identical to those used in 
Experiment 1 except for the final picture: That’s it! Amélie is done! The cookies are ready! 
Mum says: “You can have some!”. She puts three small cookies on a plate. You can give 
cookies to Amélie and Hélène. Picture 1, displaying Amélie and Hélène‘s faces, was shown 
again so that the children could distribute the cookies. We then waited 10 seconds or for a 
clear sign from the child that she had finished distributing (e.g., ―I‘m done‖). The ―initial‖ 
distribution was recorded at this point. If the child had not distributed all the cookies, the 
experimenter went on saying: Well done! Very nice! Oh, look, there’s some left. Who do you 
want to give it to? To Amélie or to Hélène? (order of names counterbalanced) and repeated 
the procedure until all cookies were given out (children could thus distribute the cookies in 
one, two, or three steps). The ―final‖ distribution was recorded at this point. The experimenter 
then asked the child to justify the distribution: Oh! Look! Amélie/Hélène (depending on the 
child’s distribution) has more! Why did she get more? 
 
Results and discussion 
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In what follows, we take three variables into account: i) who was given a cookie first, 
ii) children‘s initial distribution, and iii) children‘s final distribution.  
59 out of 75 children gave the first cookie to the big contributor, which differs from 
chance, p < .0001, two-choice binomial, OR = 3.69 (27 out of 33 3-year-olds, p < .0003, two-
choice binomial, OR = 4.5, and 32 out of 42 4-year-olds, p < .001, two-choice binomial, OR = 
3.2).  
Children‘s initial distribution was mainly egalitarian: 44 out of 75 children gave one 
cookie to each girl (17 3-year-olds, 27 4-year-olds, p < .0001 in both cases, nine-choice 
binomial, OR = 11.35). Among the 31 children choosing an unequal initial distribution, 26 
favoured the greater contributor, which differs from chance, p < .0002, two-choice binomial, 
OR = 5.2 (14 out of 16 3-year-olds, p < .005, two-choice binomial, OR = 7.0 and 12 out of 15 
4-year-olds, p < .04, two-choice binomial, OR = 4.0), with no difference between the age 
groups, χ²(2) = 1.57, p = .46. Interestingly, there was no difference between the mean age of 
the 44 egalitarian children (M = 49.4, SD = 6.9) and the mean age of the 26 children favouring 
the greater contributor (M = 48.2, SD = 6.0), t(67) = .74, p = .46, which suggests that equal 
distributions were not specifically favoured by the youngest. 
 
Please insert Figure 2 about here 
 
In the final distribution, the greater contributor was favoured by 56 children out of 75, 
p < .0001, two-choice binomial, OR = 2.95. This was confirmed when both age groups were 
considered separately, with 26 out of 33 3-year-olds, p < .002, two-choice binomial, OR = 
3.71 and 30 out of 42 4-year-olds favouring Amélie, p < .008, two-choice binomial, OR = 2.5. 
Interestingly, all 4-year-olds chose to give two cookies to Amélie and one to Hélène and none 
decided to give all three cookies to Amélie. Amongst the 3-year-olds, 22 gave two cookies to 
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Amélie and one to Hélène, and only 4 gave all three cookies to Amélie. In line with 
Experiment 1, distributions were influenced neither by age group, χ²(1) =  .21, p = .65, nor 
child‘s sex, χ²(1) = .74, p = .39. 
We also analysed the behaviour of the 44 children who had been egalitarian in their 
initial distribution separately. When these children were encouraged to give the third cookie, 
30 children favoured the greater contributor (p < 0.03, two-choice binomial, OR = 2.14), with 
no difference between the age groups (χ²(1) = 0.74, p = .79). 
Finally, we analysed children‘s justifications following the same procedure as in 
Experiment 1 and found that a minority of children provided correct justifications (13 children 
out of 75, 2 out of 33 among 3-year olds and 11 out of 42 among 4-year olds). Again, there 
was a significant increase in children‘s capacity to justify their judgments with age (p = .03, 
Fisher‘s test, OR = 5.5). 
Experiment 2 shows that, in Amélie and Hélène‘s story, children judge equality to be 
the best solution. Further evidence suggests that they still think that a greater contributor has a 
right to more of the stock of commonly produced tokens. 
 
General discussion 
In this paper, we demonstrate that children as young as 3 are able to take merit into 
account when distributing tokens. In Experiment 1, children consistently gave the biggest 
cookie to the biggest contributor, showing an ability to match contribution and distribution. 
To our knowledge, this is the first demonstration of a consistent understanding of merit and 
equity before the age of six (Damon, 1975, 1980; Enright, et al., 1984; Enright & Sutterfield, 
1980; Kohlberg, 1969; McGillicuddy-de Lisi, et al., 1994; Nelson & Dweck, 1977; Peterson, 
et al., 1975; Sigelman & Waitzman, 1991). These results are in line with recent experimental 
findings demonstrating that more basic moral principles (e.g., equality) are also grasped early 
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on in development (Hamann et al., 2011; Warneken et al., 2011). In Experiment 2, children 
had the opportunity to be egalitarian and their modal response was to share one cookie with 
each recipient. When prompted to give the remaining cookie however, most children gave 
more to the harder worker.   
These results go against previous theories predicting 1) a late development of equity 
and 2) a stage-like progression from simple rules (e.g., equality) to more complex ones (e.g., 
equity). On the contrary, we observed 1) that young children understand that the greater 
contributor has more rights than the lesser contributor over the tokens to be distributed and 2) 
that children may have an initial preference for equality while being able to take merit into 
account when prompted to.  
Our studies thus enabled to disentangle children‘s ability to take merit into account 
from their preferences. Many previous studies had demonstrated that young children tend to 
distribute goods equally (Damon, 1975, 1980; Enright, et al., 1984; Enright & Sutterfield, 
1980; Kohlberg, 1969; McGillicuddy-de Lisi, et al., 1994; Nelson & Dweck, 1977; Peterson, 
et al., 1975; Sigelman & Waitzman, 1991) but whether they were unwilling or unable to 
perform equitable distributions remained unclear. Conversely, our studies suggest that young 
children have the ability to be equitable, but may nonetheless prefer to distribute goods 
equally when they have the opportunity to do so.  
There are a number of reasons why children might have preferred egalitarian 
distributions in these experimental settings (and in their initial distribution in Experiment 2), 
some of which may have nothing to do with equity: Children may find the egalitarian solution 
more salient; they may be trying to demonstrate that they have good counting skills and that 
they can split tokens equally; they may be assuming that the experimenter expects them to 
produce an egalitarian distribution, and so on. Alternatively, children may choose equality 
simply because it appears to them as the most equitable solution. After all, both Amélie and 
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Hélène contributed to baking the cookies, Amélie and Hélène are friends, Hélène went to play 
dolls with Amélie‘s approval, and the extra effort involved on Amélie‘s part is not that big. In 
other words, they may realise that Amélie has slightly more rights over the cookies, but the 
extra merit involved may not warrant going so far as to offer twice as many cookies (for a 
similar point, see Kenward & Dahl, 2011).  
One limitation of the present studies is that they do not allow to disentangle these 
alternative interpretations. Therefore, characterising which contexts favour a spontaneous 
preference for equality will be an important route for future investigations. The adult literature 
suggests that in interactions with relatives or friends, people prefer egalitarian distributions 
(Clark & Mills, 1979; Deutsch, 1975; Fiske, 1992). In long-term relationships, it indeed 
makes sense to share things equally as individual contributions are likely to be roughly 
equalised in the long run. It would thus be interesting to manipulate friendship status or length 
of relationship in order to assess the influence of relationship status on children‘s judgments 
of fairness.  
It would also be interesting to explore other factors known to influence judgments of 
fairness. For instance, previous studies on justice have shown that adults take into account 
talents, handicap and privileges (Cappelen, Sorensen, & Tungodden, 2010; Konow, 2003). 
Whether children also take these factors into account from very early on remains an open 
question. For instance, would they think that Amélie deserves more cookies if she has been 
more productive because her mother helped her or because she is older? Would they think that 
Amélie deserves more if she spends more time cooking even if she is eventually less 
productive than Hélène? What if Hélène had never helped in the first place and arrived as a 
Amélie‘s guest? What if they had worked equally hard on different tasks (e.g. one is baking 
cookies, the other is cleaning the drawing room)? The scope of these findings therefore 
remains limited and an important next step will be to further study which features are salient 
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to young children, under what conditions they are taken into account, and what are relevant 
mitigating factors influencing children‘s equity judgments. 
Another limitation is that the study does not allow to understand the relationship 
between nascent intuitions of fairness and their impact on moral behaviour. Earlier studies 
have shown that children as old as 8 years old fail to forgo their own interests in order to 
distribute goods in a fair way. In our study, the participant was put in the position of being the 
impartial referee who has to make the call about fair-sharing. However, this context tells us 
nothing about what they would have done if they had had an interest in keeping some of the 
cookies to themselves. It is indeed conceivable that the developmental trajectory differs for 
moral intuitions and moral behaviour and that the former matures sooner than the latter.  
Finally, how much the sense of fairness is innately predetermined and how much it is 
constrained by environmental or cultural factors remains an open question. Though most 
children this age spend a lot of time in a benevolent family environment and are rarely in a 
position to distribute the product of collective actions, they still have at least two years of 
experience engaging in social interactions involving collaboration and conflicts of interests: 
they have to share toys, take turns, help out, etc. (Ross, 1996). On the other hand, 
observations of children‘s everyday interactions highlight that children as young as two 
spontaneously produce complex judgments of justice (Dunn & Munn, 1987). Teasing apart 
the effects of innate dispositions, environment and culture therefore calls for further 
investigation. For instance, it would be interesting to assess the generalizability of our 
findings and compare the development of fairness in traditional societies where different 
norms and values are promoted. 
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Figure 1. Pictures used in the Experiments 1a, 1b and 2. 
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Figure 2. Pattern of initial distribution in 3- and 4-year-olds. 
 
 
